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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

STAI'E OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 19,138

OREM CITY, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah;
PAYSON CITY, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah;
and PLEASANT GROVE CITY, a
municipal corporation of the
State of Utah,
Defendants-Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS CITY OF OREM AND PAYSON CITY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is an appeal from a decision granting the respon-

dent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Allen B. Sorensen
presiding,

granted Respondent Utah County's Motion

Summary Judgment

on

the

issue of whether

for

the appellant

cities have a duty under Utah law to reimburse the respondent
for

the costs

incurred

in housing violators of municipal

ordinances in the county jail.

The

trial court ruled

that

the cities have a duty to reimburse the Count; on the basis
1

oE

3ec.

10-8-58, Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended),

and in reliance upon the case of Grand Forks County v. City
of Grand Forks, 123

42

(N.D. 1963).

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The

appellants seek to have

this Court reverse the

summary judgment granted below and instruct the trial court
to enter summary judgment for the appellants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are as set forth in the statement
of facts contained in appellants' original brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RELEVANT UTAH STATUTES DEALING
WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTY JAIL
COSTS, READ AS A WHOLE, INDICATE CLEAR
LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT SECTION 10-8-58,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED),
IS NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS EMPOWERING
UTAH MUNICIPALITIES TO CONTRACT FOR
THE USE OF UTAH COUNTY JAILS.
In the trial court, Judge Sorensen granted the respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that the "defendant
cities have a legal duty"

to pay the expenses of housing

prisoners in the Utah County jail when such prisoners are
confined there for violating appellants' municipal ordinances.
The only explanation for

this conclusion was that it was

"in accordance with Section 10-8-58, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended),

and the case of Grand Forks County vs. City of Grand Forks,
2

12 3 N. W.

at 3,
the

2d 4 2. "

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Respondent Utah County extrapolates from that conclusion
theory that Sec.

10-8-58

to contract with a county for
consequently,

"create [s]

a municipal ;:iower

the use of

its Jail;"

and,

the appellant cities have become liable for

the jail costs at issue under an implied contract,

in that

they have received services they could have legally contracted
for.

Brief for Respondent at 9-10.

for

the

reasons set forth below,

not enable municipalities
the

use

of

for

finding

the
an

Appellants contend,

that Sec.

10-8-58 does

to contract with counties

county jails and that
implied contract here,

there
if

is

that

for

no basis
is

indeed

the basis for the judgment below.
The question of which Utah political subdivision is
to bear

the cost of incarcerating prisoners in a

county

jail is clearly addressed in various sections of the Utah
Code.

As stated in appellants' initial brief, sec.

explicitly

requires

persons committed to

the county sheriff
jail." The

provides no optional right of

statute

17-22-3

"to receive all
is mandatory;

refusal.

it

Both Sec. 17-22-8

and Sec. 17-15-17(3) designate the expense of housing prisoners
in

the

county jail as a county expense.

The

respondent

itself admits that, at least initially, counties are obligated
to pay all jail costs, which admission implicitly acknowledges
that counties cannot unreasonably refuse to accept prisoners
committed

to

the

county

jail.

Brief

for

Respondent at

S.

The

respondent county then asserts that the appellant

cities should be liable for
other Utah statutes

the "ultimate jail costs" because

require certain governmental entities

to reimburse counties for the expenses incurred by counties
in jailing persons incarcerated for violating state statutes
or local ordinances.

Brief for Respondent at 4-6.

However,

a careful review of these statutes will show that the counties
are entitled to reimbursement only in a few limited circumstances.

In addition,

the

1983 amendment of Sec. 17-22-8

by the Utah Legislature indicates that
interpretation

is

incorrect and

the respondent's

that a county's right to

reimbursement has been expressly limited to a few specified
circumstances.

Section 17-22-8 presently reads:

The sheriff must receive all persons committed
to jail by competent authority and see that they
are provided with necessary food, clothing and
bedding in the manner prescribed by the board
of county commissioners.
The expense incurred
in providing the above services to prisoners
shall be paid out of the county treasury except
as provided in Sections 17-22-8.5 and 17-22-10.
The relevant portion of Sec. 17-22-8.5, U.C.A., reads:
The state shall reimburse any county for the
actual costs of incarceration for a person convicted
of any felony and sentenced to serve in a county
jail as a condition of probation.
This

same

requirement was previously found in Sec. 77-18-1,

U.C.A., before being relocated and made a separate section
by the same 1983 legislative act which amended Sec. 17-22-8.
The other stated exception,
that

a

sheriff

is

not

Sec.

required
4

17-22-10, U.C.A.,
to receive or

states

care for

a

person committed upon process in a civil action or proceeding
"unless security is given on the part of the party at whose
instance the process is

issued."

initial brief, an accepted

<\s stc1ted in the appellants'

rule of

regarding express exceptions

statutory construction

to a general statutory rule

is that the legislature creating such exceptions did
intend additional exceptions.
at 6-7.

not

Initial Brief for Appellant

The Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized

and applied this rule of construction in Broadbent v. Gibson,
105 Utah 53, 67-68, 140 P.2d 939,
Appellants find
and Sec. 17-22-8.5
were

943

it noteworthy

(1943).
that both Sec. 10-8-58

(in the prior language of Sec.

in existence when

77-18-1)

the exceptions to Sec. 17-22-8 were

amended by the 1983 Utah Legislature; yet, only Sec. 17-22-8.5
was added

to the

list of statutory exceptions.

find

this

indicative of a clear legislative intent

Sec.

10-8-58 should not be interpreted as requiring cities

to reimburse counties for

the use of

county

Appellants

jails,

that

for

that statute was not included as an exception to the obligation
of counties to pay the expense of housing all county jail
prisoners.
The

respondent's

interpretation of the

between Sec. 17-22-8 and 10-8-58 would
to

make the determination

that

relationship

require this Court

the Utah Legislature did

not intend to limit the stated exceptions

in Sec.

to those found in Sections 17-22-8.5 and 17-22-10.
5

17-22-8
However,

rule of construction given above, the Legislature's
failure
the

to include "city prisoners"

requirement of Sec.

as

an exception

17-22-8 indicates an

to

intent that

counties alone bear the ultimate expense in housing violators
of appellants' ordinances in the county jail.
The

appellant cities also cited

the 1983 amendment

to Sec. 32-1-24 in their

initial brief as another statute

indicating legislative

intent that counties bear the sole

responsibility for paying jail costs connected with housing
violators

of municipal

ordinances

Initial Brief for Appellants at 4-5.

in the county jail.

The

respondent's

attempt to explain the special appropriation to counties
for

jail expenses under Sec.

(1953, as amended),
fails

to meet

argument here,

32-1-24, Utah Code Annotated

(Brief for Respondent at 6-7), completely

the

appellants'

argument.

Restating that

appellants observe that the $1,087,500.00

(25% of $4,350,000)

designated by sec.

32-1-24(1)

to be

used specifically "for confinement and rehabilitation or
both,

and construction and maintenance of facilities for

confinement or rehabilitation or both of persons arrested
for

or

convicted of alcohol related offenses"

priated only to Utah counties.
the

It

is

important

to

note

reference to "alcohol related offenses." This generic

designation indicates that these funds
only

is appro-

for

the

are available not

confinement of violators of state DUI and

intoxication laws, but also for the confinement of violators
6

of municipal DUI ordinances.
the funds.
does,

It is

the

offenders,
according
such

not

fact

that

respondent

rncarcerating

position,

costs without

the beer tax revenues.
the

tc1e

certain

intend to drd the cities who would,

the counties'

increased

,_ls

,:<tended to aid the counties

increased costs

but did
to

onlj t11e countie3 rece1-1e

to 3r J '",

that the State

in paying

of

'i.cc,

lie

financial

required

to

assistance

This is particularly

true

in

pay
from

light

the cities prosecute a great

of the DUI offenders in the state.

It is much more logical

to conclude

appropriated all of the

that

the

Legislature

beer tax incarceration money

to the counties because

are

required

the political entities

in Utah.

to bear

The appellants' position that Sec.

they

these costs

32-1-24 indicates

a legislative intent that counties in Utah are solely liable
for

jail costs does not, as the respondent fears,

funding

for

those entities

"decrease

. which are legally required

to shoulder the cost of both construction and maintenance
of jails and rehabilitation centers, as well as the confinement
of both county

and

state alcohol offenders."
Rather,

under

still

receive

priated to them under Sec.

32-1-24.

Respondent at 7.
such entities will

the
the

to

it,

money

which

appellants do

respondent
not seeK
7

to

appellants'
total

for

argument,

funds

appro-

ConLrary to respondent's

belief that the appellants are seekin•3
replace

Brief

to '1ave

these funds

.:ippellants owe
these

state

funds

!:'?PL'!Ce an·1t'1ing.
exi.3ted.

One cannot replace something which never

The expenses

a cnarge against

incurred

in housing prisoners

the county treasury.

is

This appropriation

should simply be added to the amount already budgeted from
the general

funds of

the county, which

from taxes imposed county wide.
to

reimburse

funds

are derived

If the cities were required

the county in addition

this money, the result would be an

to counties getting

illogical windfall for

the counties.
The

mandatory nature of Sec.

17-22-8, coupled with

the specific absence of any statutory right to reimbursement
from cities for county jail costs, shed light on the proper
interpretation of Sec.

10-8-58.

Section 10-8-58

is simply

an enabling statute to allow cities to choose between building
their own. jails to house violators of city ordinances or
to use the county jail to house such prisoners.

The geograph-

ical distance of a municipality from the county jail, as
well

as

the personnel and

may dictate
rather

than

transportation costs

involved,

that a city construct its own jail facility
transport prisoners

jail.

Other reasons

etc.)

may cause

to and

from

the county

(including security, lack of manpower,

the governing body of a city to provide

a jail facility for the incarceration of prisoners pursuant
to commitment orders

issued by competent authority.

Such

considerations explain the statutory option provided

a
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Michigan Compiled ;:,aws Annotated sec.

1980-1981).

In turn,

t:-ie countf is required

to pay all the expenses of µrisoners convicted for violating
city ordinances where courts of the first and second class
have jurisdiction,
while
of

M.C.L.A.

Sec. 801.4a

the cities must pay

the

third class

payment

of

the

fe>r

1980-1981),

those exµenses when courts

have jurisdiction.

expense of

(Supp.

Id.

at

478

incarcerating prisoners

The
in a

county jail is dependent on which entitJ receives the benefit
of

the

fines.

Statutes regulating payment of fines

Utah are not so structured.
of Sec.

78-4-22,

one-half of

Prior

to the 1983 amendment

Utah Code .:'\nnotated

fines and all e>f

in

(1953,

as amended),

bail forfeitures resulting

from violation of Aµpellant City of Orem's ordinances were
paid

to the City.

statute,

Following

Thus,

t:1e reasoning in City of Grand

K.apids is unpersuasi·:e Ln Utai1,
reflecting

in utah.

this

the City retains no fines and onl; e>ne-half of

the bail forfeitures.

not

t:-ie 1983 amendment e>f

t:-ie

oeirq dee i·ied .rnder statJtes

legis:ative

requirements

•I

l ts

1:; l

t

1

un.
36

12,),
re '.]'U i red

C.:•)Unt;

t hat
Jail

In Sonoma County v.

·; i o 1 a to r s

state

f

erroneousl; committed

the

expenses

1 aw

sen ten c e d

to

the

the city recorder

"city prisoners"

in boarding

the city a

but instead,

house

be

provision

cit/ ordinances be sentenced

to

for

them.

the county

the

payment

There was no

permissive use of

the county

the decision was based on the city charter

provision expressly prohibiting the
to

city cnarter

to be responsible

incurred

statute granting
Jail,

a

In that particular case,

The city was held
of

,J

1nd violators of

to the cit; jail.
'ud

(la99J,

810

City of Santa Rosa,

use of

violators of city ordinances.

3rants Utah municipalities a
jails, and hence,

the

county

jail

Section 10-8-58

permissive use of

the county

the holding of Sonoma County is inapplicable

in Utah.
respondent also cites Washington Township Hospital
District of Alameda County v. County of Alameda,
2d

272,

69

Cal.

Rptr.

442

(1968),

263 Cal. App.

as authority

for

"the

general rule that cities are liable for

the cost of

:tty prisoners

Brief for Respondent

at

3-4.

inj1c3ted

in

the

county

However,

the

basis

jail."
for

that

"general

in Washington Township Hospital

:3L. Gov't Code Sec.

36903

housing

rule"

was

District to be

(West 1968), which read:

Imprisonment for violation of an ordinance shall
be in the cit} j3il, unless by ordinance the
body prescribes imprisonment in the
countv J3il.
If cit} prisoners are imprisoned

in the county jail the expense is a charge against
the city.
Thus,

the "general rule"

applicable in
a

relied on

jurisdictions which,

by

respondent

is only

like California,

have

statute expressly making the expense of imprisoning "city

prisoners" a city charge.

Utah is not such a jurisdiction.

In fact, a California court in a decision rendered subsequent
to Washington Township, set forth the "general rule" correctly
when it stated:
The general rule is that a public corporation
is liable for prison expenses when, and only
when, such liability is imposed by statute, and
that in no case may a public corporation be held
liable for prison expenses merely by implication.
City of Pasadena v.
497,

499,

258 P.2d 28,

is contrary to the
Utah statute
Utah

Los Angeles County,
30

(1953).

118 Cal. App.

Thus, the "general rule"

respondent's position,

imposing

municipalities.

2d

liability for

there

being no

prison expenses

on

Section 10-8-58 of the Utah Code

simply enables cities to construct jails or use the county
j ai 1.

It imposes no obligation on Utah cities to pay for

the cost of incarcerating "city prisoners,"

and appellant

is not aware of any other Utah statute which mandates such
a requirement.
None

of

the

cases relied on by

the

respondent were

decided under a statutory scheme similar to that established
in Utah.

Because the determination of who

is

to pay the

cost of incarcerating prisoners is based in statutory law,
and not on any "general rule,"
15

the

statutory differences

noted in the cases above make respondent's cases inapplicable
in interpreting the Utah statutes.

Contrary to respondent's

allegation that "appellants have failed to cite any authority
contrary to the general rule that cities are liable
tne

cost of housing city prisoners

Brief for Respondent at 4,

for

in the county jail,"

appellants have cited specific

statutory authority, i.e. Sections 17-15-17(3) and 17-22-8,
U.C.A.

(1953, as amended),

as

such

authority

in Utah.

Appellant cities have cited no cases in support of their
position simply because the case law dealing with the issue
at hand has not been decided under a statutory scheme similar
to Utah's.
The

key

to

all

of

the

cases and statutes cited by

all of the parties in this action is that each state has
the
of

right

to define

the duties and obligations of each

its political subdivisions.

The cities and counties

in Utah are controlled by state statutes and must follow
the dictates of these laws.

In this

case,

Utah county

is attempting to avoid its responsibility under Utah law
by reliance upon cases from other jurisdictions whose legislatures have enacted laws that establish different obligations
as between cities and counties.

The Court should not be

misled by these decisions but should determine the responsibilities of the parties pursuant to the clear
the Utah statutes cited above.

16

intent of

THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE aESPONDENT
ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT AN IMPLIED OR
QUASI CONTRACT EXISTS BETWEEN THE RESPONDENT
AND APPELLANT, WHICH CONTRACT REQUIRES
THE APPELLANTS TO REIMBURSE THE RESPONDENT
FOR USE OF ITS JAIL.
Not only did the district court err
Sec. 10-8-58 as allowing cities
for

use of county jails,

in interpreting

to contract with counties

but it also erred if its cryptic

conclusion is to be read to imply that any type of contract
dealing with

jail costs existed between appellant cities

and the respondent.
Because

the

court

below

the appellants are under a

based

its conclusion

legal duty

to

reimburse

respondent on the case of Grand Forks County,

t:-iat
the
it

is assumed that the district court was proposing that grounds
existed

to

find

an

appellant cities and

implied-in-law contract between the
the

respondent.

The North

Dakota

supreme Court stated in Grand Forks County:
Decisions holding a municipality liable on implied
contract for benefits received are based on the
theory that a municipal corporation ought not
to receive benefits which it can legally acquire
by contract, but for which it has not contracted,
and then avoid liability for the reasonable value
of the benefits received on the plea that no
contract had, in fact, been consumated.
123 N.W.

2d at 45.

The court also noted:

[W]here a municipality has the power to enter
into an obligation and is not prohibited from
creating a liability in any but a specified way,
it may be held liable on an implied agreement,
upon the principle of unjust enrichment: for services
rendered and for goods furnished.
17

Id. at 46.

This language is similar to this Court's explanation

of a "quasi contract"

(synonym for

in Rapp v. Salt Lake City,

implied-in-law contract)

527 P.2d 651

(Utah 1974):

[A quasi contractual obligation] is imposed by
the law for the purpose of bringing about justice
without reference to the intention of the parties.
Such obligations are not true contracts but are
based on unjust enrichment or restitution • • . . Where
the facts indicate a duty of the defendant to
pay, the law imputes to him a promise to fulfill
that obligation.
Id. at 654-55.
Assuming
theory was

that

this

the basis for

respondent's Motion
here that
for

five

acquire

implied-in-law or quasi contract

for

the district court granting the
Summary Judgment, appellants argue

it was error for
related

the district court

reasons:

( 1)

to so hold

Utah cities cannot legally

by contract the use of county

jails,

(2)

there

can

be no

implied-in-law contract where such an agreement

was

not formally approved by the appellants,

can

be no consideration provided by counties in providing

prisoners the use of county
are

legally obligated

jails because

to provide

(3)

the

such service,

is

no consideration by counties because cities

no

benefit unique

do not, in fact,
The
I, supra.

first

to

themselves,

(5)

counties
(4)

there

receive

the appellants

"use" the county jail.
reason given has been explained

Summarized briefly,

Utah cities

and

there

to build their

use the county jails.

Sec.

in POINT

10-8-58 only enables

own city-operated

jails or to

Because counties are already obligated
18
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Orem operates

of

government.
contracts

legislation unpose
For example, Appellant

Proceuures
U.C.A.),

of

under

the "council-manager"

Section 10-3-1223,

for

requires

U.C.A.,

the City to be executed on

Section 10-6-138 of

its ma:r)[.

Utah Cities"
the cit/

contracts made on oenalf

the

recorder

of

and

requires

"Uniform

(Cnapter

form

its behalf
Fiscal

6 of Title

10,

to "countersign all

the city and

maintain

a properly indexed record of all such contracts."

Sections

of t'1e Orem Cit::; Code impose parallel formalities

upon contracts
l Ll - tJ - 1

'l ,

c3se

Cit/ of

by

-'-

t :1 ·::

certain formalities on appellants here.

all

1"'

requirement of certain

is no contract
S27
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U. C •A. ,

the City.
; ? ec

l

i c 3 11

vo

Additionally,
l ', 1.:;

·..:: o

rt

c r a c t.;

Sec.

en t e r e 1

3 er-:.

,_,n·.Jn._:.:_ J.tej

l \) - 6 - 1 J :.. ,

:J • C ...:'.\ . ,

·..; '.l

i

·= :1

:.. .; : 3

ne

:. t

,:i

'Jr

:? ) st=.;

') f

r:.: 1 '-:"

" Jn

)

1

; i r '.) v

r

i Je

Pr oc ed u r

3

t 1«

:J u iJ l

0

ic

ci n J

s Act for
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i n v e s tor s
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wi t
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. to

•

i n f or ma t i on

abou t

f111anc1cil policies and administration of cities.

t:ie

fh1s Court
in

l

i=' ,_ s c

.11

tnat

in Rapo specifically found the plaintiff's claim

case

co

"be directed

contractual obligation,"
that

527

towards enforcing

P.2d

at

654,

a

but still

neld

plaintiff encounters the statutory requirements

which mandate his contractual obligation
fulfillment of
Thus,

655.

the

requisite

the court below

suggesting

the

is void without

formalities."

in

the

527

P.2d at

instant case erred

existence of a quasi contract where

requisite statutory formalities

were

in
the

not observed between

the respondent and appellants.
Reason three above is based on the statutory obligation
of counties to house and pay the jail costs of all prisoners
committed

to

the count1

jails.

amounts to a pre-existing duty,
any consideration on

agreement

statutory obligation

the presence of which ·;itiates

the part of counties.

said in Baggs v. Anderson,
"[A] n

This

528 P.2d 141,

to do that which one

is

143

As this Court
(Utah 1974):

already

required

to do does not constitute consideration for a new promise."
Se<c>

also

County

i'le•;ada 1980).
a:v:

otner

of Clark

Absent

v.

Bonage '.-lo.

consideration,

1,

neither

615

P.2d 939

a quasi

nor

of contr.:ict can be found between the appellants

anJ the respondent.
'lot onlJ can

no consideration
20

be found

to

have

been

given by the County under

the pre-existing duty rule,

but

there is no consideration given by the County in the instant
case because the appellant cities receive no benefits from
the use of the county jail which are not shared by Utah
residents in general.

The

respondent enumerates in POINT

II of its brief various benefits which it claims are received
by the appellant cities when "city prisoners" are housed
in the county jail.

Brief for Respondent at 7-10.

respondent in turn argues

that the alleged receipt of the

benefits entitles it to compensation from
on

a

The

quasi contract theory.

However,

the appellants

close analysis of

these benefits indicate that they are not received uniquely
by the appellants, but are enjoyed by all state residents.
First,

respondent

implies that appellants

receive

a benefit from receipt of fine and forfeiture monies assessed
against city ordinance violators.
at 7-B.

Brief for

As noted at page 12, supra,

Respondent

Appellant

City of

Orem does not receive any money from the payment of fines
when a prisoner is committed to the county jail.

U.C.A. Sec.

78-4-22 now requires that all fines resulting from convictions
in circuit courts be
is

true

that

forfeitures,

remitted

to the state.

the City may receive
any time a prisoner

Although

it

fifty percent of bail
is

present before

the

court and is fined and sentenced to jail, the City receives
nothing.

When bail is forfeited,

the court and no

the arrestee is not before

jail sentence is
21

imposed; therefore,

the

of
is

that

Jail,

any

jail

costs does not arise.

time a prisoner

he or

she will

is committed

have been

The end result
to

the

county

taken before a judge; and,

at that point, the City receives no monetary benefit from
the imposition of any fine.
Second,
10-8-85

the

(1953,

respondent cites Utah Code Annotated Sec.

as amended),

as bestowing

on cities

the

benefit of using county jail prisoners on city projects.
Brief for Respondent at 8.
it would appear
cities

In the context given by respondent,

that Sec. 10-8-85 is limited to permitting

to use only "city prisoners"

on city projects.

However,

the

committed

to the county or municipal jail or other place

of

statute permits cities to use

incarceration"

on

such

projects

person

(emphasis added).

Cities, then, can command the work of a prisoner convicted
of committing a criminal act

in the unincorporated area

of a county just as well as commanding the labor of a person
imprisoned for violating a municipal ordinance.

Similarly,

under the statute a city could exercise the same privilege
even if

no "city prisoners" were

benefit bestowed by Sec.
whether

in the county jail.

10-8-85 is available

Any

to cities

"city prisoners" are housed by the county or not.

Therefore,

Sec.

10-8-85 benefits are

not

a

function of

counties housing "city prisoners," but are simply the result
of cities being entitled
the county jail.

to make use of any prisoner

in

Appellants also note that Utah Code Annotated

22

Sec.

17-5-31

(1953,

as amended), grants counties a similar

right to have any jail prisoner work on county projects.
It reads:
[Counties] may provide for the working of prisoners
confined in the county jail under convictions
for misdemeanors
. for the benefit of the
county, upon public grounds, roads, streets,
alleys, highways or public buildings, when under
such judgment of conviction or existing laws
such prisoners are liable to labor.
Thus,

the benefits of prisoner labor are available to both

counties and cities and

is not an exclusive privilege of

the entity whose law the prisoner happened to violate.
Third,

respondent

alleges

that appellants

receive

a benefit from having "city prisoners" housed in the county
jail by being relieved of an obligation which appellants
are "under a duty"
9.

to provide.

Brief for Respondent

Because respondent does not cite

the source of such

a statutory duty, it is assumed that respondent finds
an obligation in sec. 10-8-58.

at

such

However, as noted previously,

that statute is simply an enabling act permitting cities
to build city jails or

to use county jail facilities for

incarcerating violators of city ordinances.

It

is

not

a mandatory statute requiring cities to jail such violators

in city jails.

Appellants, being under no statutory obligation

to imprison "city prisoners" in city jails, are not relieved
of any costs by respondent fulfilling the duty and obligation
imposed upon it by Sec. 17-22-8.
Although

the benefits discussed above are
23

the only

ones

by

the

respondent as being received by the

appellants, appellants note that this Court may find appellants
are

benefited in the use of the county jail by the purposes

behind incarceration, such as protection, deterrence, rehabilitation

and punishment.

receipt of
infra,

these benefits,

they assert

that

by county residents as
Hence,

While appellants do not deny the
is explained in POINT IV,

such benefits are likewise enjoyed

well as

appellants do not

conferred

as

upon all state

Utah

residents in general.

receive any unique
residents

benefits not

by law and,

thus,

are

finding,

nor

not liable to Utah County on any contract theory.
Finally,
was it ever
jail

there

is

no factual basis

stipulated,

that appellants "use"

within the contemplation of Sec.

for post-conviction detainees.
initial brief,
ordered there

the prisoners
by a

judge of

are officers of the state,
control

over

and does not,
The

county

the

sent
the

sheriff,

not of

prisoner

therefore,
in

the county

10-8-58, at least

As stated in appellants'

Initial Brief for Appellant at 10.

no

for

at

to

jail are

Eighth Circuit

Court.

The circuit court judges
the City.
the

control
turn,

the county

The City has

time of sentencing

the

receives

use of

the

jail.

the prisoners at

the county jail, not because the City expressly or impliedly
asks him to, but because a state judge commits the prisoners
to him and because he

is

required

The County Commissioners here

by law

have
24

never

to

receive them.

made acceptance

of

"city prisoners" at

by the cities.

the

jail contingent

The sheriff simpl/ accepts

upon

payment

the prisoners

because the law says he must.
In summation,
counties for

cities are not enabled to contract w1t.1

the use of

statutory formalities

the county

required

entities were not observed,

jails,

the

requisite

in contracts with public

counties

have a pre-existing

duty to pay the expenses of housing prisoners in the count/
jail, cities receive no unique benefits
the county providing

to themselves

the jail and paying

related housing

costs, and the appellant cities do not in fact
county

jail within

the

by

"use"

contemplation of sec.

the

10-8-58.

This being true, it is clear that the district court erred
in concluding that appellants here are liable to the respondent
under

any quasi contract theory.

reason

to

find

There

is no equitable

that cities should pay counties

for

the

jail costs involved here.
POINT IV
THE INCARCERATION OF CONVICTED VIOLATORS
OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES SERVES A VALID
STATE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE STATE MAY
REQUIRE THE EXPENDITURE OF COUNTY REVENUES,
WHICH REQUIREMENT DOES NOT CONTRAVENE
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Respondent

and Amicus Utah Association of Counties

contend that requiring counties to pay the cost of incarcerating
convicted violators of municipal ordinances
county purpose and that such a
violative of Art.

XIII,

Sec.

requirement

no
is,

therefore,

5, of the Utah Constituti•)ri.

25

,iri·•f L>t

R•e>spondent at 11-13, Brief for Amicus Association

)f

3t

However, Utah case

law

indicates

that

r:u, ,:irot ct1·)n of the public through law enforcement and
0

incarceration of convicted criminals
purpose

for

which

Jf county funds;

the

state can

and therefore,

is

require

a

valid

public

the expenditure

neither Sections 17-15-17(3)

and 17-22-8 of the Utah Code nor appellants' position offend
the Utah Constitution.
As

stated

provisions

by

Amicus

like Art.

XIII,

Utah Association of Counties,
sec.

to advance statewide purposes.
of Counties at 6.

Thus,

(1913).

v.

of Chapter

144 of

the holding

42 Utah

that case was

the Laws

the costs of providing

Such was

Salt Lake City,

The issue in

of Utah

as amended)].

found

134 P.

560

1907,

as amended

[now

55-11-1 to -8

The Chapter required cities and counties

to jointly provide for
such acts were

548,

in Salt

the constitutionality

codified as Utah Code Annotated sections
(1353,

taxation

Brief for Amicus Association

to pay

a delegated state function.
County

permit local

the State Legislature may require

local governmental entities

Lake

5,

juvenile detention homes.

to be state functions,

Although

the requirements

)f Chapter 144 were found not to contravene any constitutional
provisions
state,

because cities and counties are

and the state was
functions

to

its

held
agents

to

have

for

rhe Court explained:
26

agents of the

the power

to assign

the good of the public.

The state government, in the discharge of its
functions, may, however, classifj the counties
and cities of the state, and may for the purpose
of augmenting the public good and welfare, treat
both counties and cities as state agencies, and
may even impose additional duties upon the residents
and taxpayers, and especially so when the latter
have a special as well as a general interest
in the thing the state is seeking to effectuate
for the public good.
Id. at 554, 134 P. at 563.

The Court also stated:

What is required from Salt Lake City is required
from it as an arm or agency of the state government.
Salt Lake City as a corporate body is
in no way interested in the moral welfare of
the delinquent children provided for in the juvenile
court law of this state, but the people who live
within the city of Salt Lake as well as those
who reside elsewhere within the state are interested,
and by reason of that fact the people of the
state, through their government, may act in such
matters and call upon both counties and cities
as state agencies to assist the state in its
effort to protect and enhance the educational
and moral welfare of delinquent children under
a certain age.
Id.

at

554-55,

134 P.

at 563.

Thus,

the Court

not only

found that the state may delegate the obligation of performing
a state function

to its political subdivisions,

but also

explicitly noted that such delegation does not alter
function's

identity as a state concern.

Similarly,

Denver and Rio Grand R.R. Co. v. Grand County,
170 P. 74

the
in

51 Utah 294,

(1917), this Court observed that requiring counties

to provide funds to certain mothers with dependent children
did not change the
local one.

identity of that function to a strictly

The Court there concluded:

to hold that the

"We are not prepared

[Dependent Mothers' Act],

not define and declare a policy of
27

the

in effect, does

state,

nor

that

it

is

not

wit:1in

the

province of the Legislature

define and declare a state policy.•

Id.

at 301,

to so

170 P.

at

76.

Respondent claims that Salt Lake County actually supports
its position
not

that the Legislature

could

interfere with activities which are a function of city

government.
not

by pointing out

arguing

Brief for
that

Respondent at 11.

the Legislature

is

Appell an ts are

indeed

interfering

with either city or county government functions by requiring
respondent to pay

the

jail costs

involved here.

they assert that the incarceration of prisoners,

Instead,
including

those convicted of violating municipal criminal ordinances,
is a statewide,

public concern,

in support of which

the

state can require the counties to expend funds.
The case of Salt Lake City v.
ation of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786

International Associ-

(Utah 1977), also supports

appellants' position that law enforcement is a state purpose.
Police and fire protection are essential to the
administration of state government, which has
the duty to protect and defend the rights of
its citizens to life, liberty, and property.
The duty of the state cannot be circumscribed
by city limits, particularly where uniform state
action may be required.
Police, fire, and health
protection are matters of statewide concern.
The exercise of the police power is an attribute
of state sovereignty, a portion of which it may
delegate, but not relinquish to municipalities,
which have none of the elements of sovereignty.
Since fire protection is a state affair, the
legislature may withdraw its delegation of power
to municipalities to determine the wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment of fire fighters,
28

and such action does not constitute an interiEmphasis
ference with a municipal function.
added.)
Id.

If

at 789.

to determine
local

tne Legislature

the wages,

firefighters,

state function,
function of

hours,

and

if

«eep t:1e power
and

other

conditions

police protection

then certainly

itself

is

of

also

the state can assign

a

the

incarceration of prisoners to the county; and

the requirement

that

the support of prisoners

a county charge does not

run afoul of of Art.

therein be
XIII, Sec.

5, of the Utah Constitution.
The

fact

that

a city arrests and convicts a criminal

offender under a municipal ordinance should not alter
fact

that

the city is

fulfilling

so.

This

is especially

true

in

the

a state purpose in doing
light of

the

fact

that

Appellant City of Orem's criminal and traffic code simply
consists of a verbatim adoption of
traffic code

the state criminal

(U.C.A. Title 76 and Chapter

respectively and Sections 16-1, -8,
City Code).

-8.l,

6 of Title 41,
and -8.2,

These provisions of the state code

the Utah Legislature's determination of

and

Orem

reflect

acts or omissions

which constitute crimes throughout the state of Utah and
for which imprisonment may be used

to deter

such conduct,

to protect state residents from those guilty of such offenses,
and to punish and rehabilitate the offenders.
of

these offenders,

whet!ler

under

Imprisonment

the state coue or

the

city code, benefits all state residents by either preventing
29

s'1c'1 conduct or
'.Jtah society.

by

removing

those guilty of the same from

The city's adoption of

these state purposes

does not magicallJ cause the state's concern in these matters
to disappear.
Furtner

evidence

that

imprisonment of municipal code

violators serves a state purpose
example.

Center

Street

is seen in the following

in Orem is one of several state

highways running through Orem city limits.

Utah Code Annotated

Sec.

When a Utah Highway

27-12-42.1(4)

(1953, as amended).

Patrol officer arrests a driver

for

DUI on Center Street,

the driver is charged under state law for a class B misdemeanor
[Utah Code Annotated Sec.

41-6-44

(1953,

as

amended)].

The driver would be prosecuted by Utah County and any resulting
incarceration of

the driver would be

a

County expense.

r: an Orem city police officer makes the same arrest on
the same street under
Sec.

the city code provision

adopting

41-6-44, the same state purposes the Utah State Legislature

desires to achieve in imprisoning the Highway Patrol arrestee
are

accomplished

police arrestee.
of the

fulfilled

The state purpose

in imprisoning
is achieved

identity of the arresting agency or

basis for

the arrest.

designated purpose
of

and

DUI conduct),

The

the city

regardless

the statutory

imprisonment fulfills

a

state-

(i.e., the further prevention or punishment
and U.C.A.

Sec.

17-22-8 designates

County as the state entity responsible
funding such state functions.

for

the

providing and

The absurdity of respondent's
30

argument that

incarceration of

expense fulfills no state purpose

"city prisoners" at count/
is shown father

ease with which cities could circumvent

the

jail costs under

Cities could simply fail

respondent's position.

by

to adopt

portions of the state criminal or traffic code which result
in "city prisoners" being

incarcerated.

Cities

required to regulate such conduct by state
authorized to do so on a permissive basis.
Annotated, Sections

10-8-47 to -51

law,

are

not

but are

See Utah Code

(1953,

as amended).

The state criminal and traffic code would continue to prohibit
the

conduct the

city no longer

regulated.

City police

officers would still be required by state law to enforce
these state criminal laws.
10-3-913 to -915 and -919

Utah Code Annotated sections

(1953, as amended).

When arrests

were made by city police officers for violations of state
laws amounting to class B or C misdemeanors,

it would fall

on the county attorneys to prosecute the violators as required
by Utah Code Annotated
as amended) .

Sec.

17-18-1(1)

and

(2)

(1953,

The prisoners would then be "county pr is oner s"

and the counties would, by the respondent's own arguments,
be required to pay for

their

incarceration

in the county

jail.
Thus,

it is clear that the statutory requirement in

Title 17 that counties pay all expenses associated

with

housing prisoners in the county jail does not contravene
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sec.

5 o E Art.

XI I I

because such

a requirement is a valid

public and county purpose.
Respondent

Utah County also contends that Sections

and 3 of Art. XIII are impinged
to

house

"city prisoners."

if counties are

required

These sections require

state to establish a uniform and equal property tax

the

rate.

The respondent believes that because residents in the unincorporated area of
law

the county are

enforcement

tax

under

the taxes collected for

required

Sec.

to pay a special

17-29-3 "over and above

general county purposes," use of

<Jeneral county funds "to pay for part of city law enforcement
by housing city prisoners"
residents being "doubly
13.

From this assumption,

that the

results
taxed."

in unincorporated area
Brief for

Respondent at

the respondent apparently concludes

uniform and equal property tax rate requirements

of Sections 2 and 3 of Art.

XIII are being violated.

The

error of the respondent's analysis is seen in the following
points.
any

First,

the State of Utah has not

nonuniform or

unequal

tax rate or

itself

scheme.

imposed
Instead,

it has required by the relevant statutes of Title 17 that
counties are

to provide

prisoners committed
dre

to

pay

entitled
does

not

a county

thereto by competent authority,

the expense of housing

to a
need

statutory right of
to

jail, are to receive all

such prisoners, unless
reimbursement.

There

be any "double taxation" of anyone

order to support the county jail.

If there

32

and

in

is double taxation,

it is

imposed as a matter of the County's choice and not

by the appellants nor by appellants'
Sections 17-15-17(3)
County could easily
the

and 17-22-8 of

impose a

interpretation of
the Utah Code.

uniform county wide

housing of inmates in the county

appellant cities would bear
other County residents.

jail.

The

tax for

Citizens of

the burden equally with

all

Any violation of Sections 2 and

3 of Art. XIII stems from the County's

improper

taxation

of the unincorporated county areas and not from state law.
Secondly,

Sec.

17-29-3 of the County Service Area

Act, Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended),

up a "double taxation" with respect to
of inmates at the county jail.
in part,

as

follows:

the

does

not set

incarceration

That provision

states,

"Whenever an unincorporated area

in a county requires one or more of

the following extended

services which are not provided on a county-wide

basis:

extended police protection

such services may be supplied

by a county service area."

(Emphasis added.)

Service Area Act provides solely for
not

provided county wide.

to the county jail, which
wide,

The County

services which

The Act cannot refer,
is a service provided

are

then,
county

and the taxes imposed under the Act cannot be applied

towards incarceration of prisoners

in

the

county

jail.

The extended police protection referred to in Sec.

17-29-3

can only refer

by

to extended patrol and protection

the

county sheriff and his deputies, who in those unincorporated
33

areas are

the chief

law enforcement officers assigned to

patrol and respond to emergency calls.

This point similarly

an3wers Amicus Utah Association of Counties'
that Sec.

17-36-9 (2) (a)

requires costs for

violators of county ordinances [to]
from general county

funds.

of Counties at 10.

That

counties

to establish a

"Municipal Capital

Brief

contention

"incarcerating

be budgeted separately"
for

Amicus Association

statute merely enables certain
"Municipal Services Fund"

Projects Fund"

and

a

from which municipal

services and municipal capital projects are to be appropriated.
Again,

if

the County

is

using

this

statute

to

impose any

additional taxes on special county service districts,
responsibility for

any resulting

"double taxation"

with the County.

Appellants do note

record

either

supports

the

county areas are being separately taxed for
Thirdly,

respondent's

lies

that nothing in the

the respondents'

Association of Counties' assertion that

the

or Amicus Utah
unincorporated
jail costs.

and Amicus Utah Association

of Counties' argument herein would actually result in "double
taxation" upon city residents.
as county residents for
including
17.

the

such

residents are taxed

county services provided

provision of a

to them,

jail as required by Title

Respondent and the Utah Association of Counties would
have city

residents also pay a separate fee for costs

incurred in housing

"city prisoners"

and cities would be paying twice for

34

in the county jail,

the same service.

Thus,

the

arguments put forth

Dy

t:1e

a;:ipellant..3

Jo

not result in any violation of Art. XIII of the Utah Constitution,

but indeed,

such constitutional provisions require

the conclusion that the court below erred in finding cities
liable for

costs of housing "city prisoners" in the county

jail.
CONCLUSION
The appellants have attempted to show that the aut.'1or ity
cited by the district court below in granting the respondents's
i"1otion for Summary Judgment does not support that conclusion.
Contrary to both the conclusion of
the

respondent's

position, Sec.

the

court below

10-8-58,

read

and

to9etner

with the other Utah statutes dealing with the responsibility
for

county jail costs,

municipalities

require Utah

to contract with Utah counties for

the county jails.
to bear

does not empower or

Rather, sec.

17-22-8 requires the counties

the cost associated in housing prisoners

county jails, including prisoners incarcerated for
municipal ordinances.

use of

in

the

violating

Utah counties cannot legitimately

condition incarceration of some prisoners in county jails
on reimbursment from the cities for
Similarly,

jail costs.

the court below and

brief erred in finding

the basis

the appellant cities and
are not enabled to enter

for

the County.
into any

the

respondent in its

any contract be'tween
First,

such contract.

contracts with cities are void where, as here,
35

Utah cities

the

second,

st3tutory contract formalities were not observed.

Third,

respondent cannot be said to furnish any consideration
t,,r

this alleged contract when it is under a pre-existing

statutory duty to pay county jail costs.

Fourth, the respondent

,Joes not provide any benefits unique to the appellants,
and thus, no grounds exist for
t :1 e county .

Fifth,

finding consideration from

the appellants do not "use" the county

Jail in that it is state judicial officers that are committing
"city prisoners" to the county jail.

These numerous points

clearly indicate that no legal grounds exist to find any
contract between the parties relative to jail cost liability.
Finally,

the arguments put forth by the appellants

in their initial brief do not contravene
of the Utah Constitution.

any provision

Rather, the Legislature's requirement

that counties provide a jail for county wide use and pay
associated expenses from taxes collected county wide serves
a valid public purpose and also produces the most equitable
approach for

providing jail facilities for

state, county

and city misdemeanants.
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse
the court below and to grant appellants' Motion for Summary
J

t.
Mc uen
City Attorney

Dave McMullin
Payson City Attorney
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D E L I V E R Y
I

hereby certify

C E R T I F I C A T E

that

I delivered a

true and correct

copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellants
and Payson City to:

City of

Orem

Neall T. Wootton, Utah County Attorney,

51 south University Avenue,

Provo,

Utah 84601;

and

Ray

Harding, Jr., Pleasant Grove City Attorney, 35 South Main,
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84604.
Delivered this

day of April, 1984.
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